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Case No. 20100291-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.

Tina Harding,
Defendant/ Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)a, (5)
(West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUB
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the following issue:
Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in its
analysis and/or application of the Fourth Amendment standards
governing the apparent authority of a person to consent to a search of
another's property.
Order, dated 27 July 2010 (a copy is attached in Addendum C).
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court
of appeals for correctness. See State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. "The
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately

reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review/' Id.
The court of appeals reviews a trial court's legal conclusions non-deferentially for
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake,
2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. It reviews the trial court's underlying factual
findings for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,111,100 P.3d 1222.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a traffic stop that resulted in her arrest, Defendant was charged
with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 20082009); possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2) (b) (West 2004); false
information to a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-8-507(2) (West 2004); and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5, 58-37-8(4)(c)
2

(West 2004). R2-1. Defendant, a passenger in the stopped vehicle, moved to
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the driver's consent to search the SUV in
which they had been traveling. R39-35. The trial court denied the motion. R77-69
(a copy is attached in Addendum A).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to
felony drug and weapon charges; the misdemeanor charges were dismissed. R9587; see also R98-97 and Rl05-04. The trial court imposed statutory prison terms of
one to fifteen years for the second degree felony and zerp to five years for the third
degree felony. R103. Those sentences were suspended and Defendant was placed
on supervised probation for 36 months. R101.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and ^ majority of the court of
appeals affirmed. R106; State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, 223 P.3d 1148 (a copy is
attached in Addendum B). This Court granted Defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari. See Addendum C.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
The trial court entered the following findings:
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic
stop on a vehicle for an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at
approximately 9:30 p.m.
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman
discovered that the driver's license had been denied.
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could
drive the vehicle from the scene, Officer Westerman requested the
names and dates of birth for each of the passengers and discovered that
none of the passengers had a valid license. [2]
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license.
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the
vehicle and told the driver she was free to leave.
6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment.
At that point Officer Westerman requested permission to look in the
vehicle and the driver gave consent. [3]
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman
asked the driver to search the vehicle, but was not involved in the
search.
1

The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1997).
2

In total, there were four occupants, inlcuding the female driver and a male
passenger in front, and another male passenger and Defendant in back. Rl 12:5-6.
3

Before the search, Officer Westerman asked the passengers to step out of the
SUV and wait with the back-up officer, "if they wanted to/' "while [he] took a look
in the vehicle." R112:15.
4

8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the
defendant's bags. They were located in a storage area directly behind
the seat in which the defendant sat as a passenger in the vehicle.
9. Before searching the bags, neither [Defendant] nor any of the [other]
passengers indicated to whom the bags belonged.
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine[,] and items identifying
[Defendant] as the owner of the bags were found in the bags during the
search. [4]
11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested
[Defendant] and during the search incident to arrest, Officer
Westerman found a blade knife on [Defendant's] person.
R76-75. The parties stipulated that the "initial traffic stop was legal," and that
"defendant ha[d] standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." R75.
Based on the above, the trial court concluded, among other things, that Officer
Westerman reasonably believed that the driver's consent tb search the SUV included
bags stowed behind the backseat. See R72-70.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case turns on whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe
that the driver's consent to search her SUV extended to bags in the rear storage area.
The trial court ruled, and a majority of the court of appeals agreed, that the officer's
4

Additionally, Officer Westerman found two bags that held non-contraband
items e.g., "electronic equipment and a keyboard." Rll2:16.
5

belief was reasonable where the bags, along with several loose items, were stowed
in the rear cargo area of the SUV; there was nothing about the bags themselves that
suggested they did not belong to the driver; and neither the driver nor her
passengers volunteered where they had been or where they were going, or that the
bags did not, in fact, belong to the driver. The majority opinion should be upheld.
Absent any indication the bags belonged to someone other than the driver, the
Fourth Amendment did not require Officer Westerman to investigate whether the
bags, in fact, belonged to the driver before he could reasonably rely on the driver's
consent to search them.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED FOURTH
AMENDMENT STANDARDS GOVERNING THE APPARENT
AUTHORITY OF A PERSON TO CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF
ANOTHER'S PROPERTY.
It is well established that a warrantless, but consensual, search is reasonable.
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,250-252 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218,228 (1973). While consent is typically obtained from the person whose property
officers seek to search, it may also be obtained from a third party who has common
authority over the property, see Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103,106 (2006); United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974), or even from a third party whom officers

6

reasonably, but mistakenly, believe has authority to consent to search the property,
see Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,188-89 (1990). The
State does not claim that Defendant consented to the search of the bags at issue, or
that the driver who did consent to the search had common authority over the bags.
Rather, the State asserts only that Officer Westerman reasonably, if mistakenly,
believed that the driver's authority to consent to search included not only the SUV,
but the bags stored in the rear cargo area. Both the trial court and a majority of the
court of appeals agreed that Officer Westerman's belief, though ultimately mistaken,
was reasonable. See State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, f f 12-19, 223 P.3d 1148.
On certioari, Defendant asks this Court to reverse the majority's affirmation of
the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress drug and weapon evidence.
Defendant asserts that the circumstances were ambigous and therefore Officer
Westerman acted unreasonably in searching the bags without first asking to whom
they belonged. See Pet. Br. at 22. This Court should affirm the majority opinion,
however, because Defendant fails to show that the circumstances here called for
further inquiry-before Officer Westerman could reasonably act on the driver's
consent to search.

7

The United States Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of apparent
authority to consent to search in Rodriguez, 497 US. at 188-89; see 4 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 8.3(g) (4th ed. 2004). "In Rodriguez, [officers] conducted a
search, reasonably but erroneously believing that a third person had authority to
consent to the search." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah App. 1991)
(discussing Rodriguez). "[S]ince [officers] reasonably believed the third person had
authority to consent to the search/' the Supreme Court held that "the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89). In other words, "[t]he doctrine of
apparent authority validates a search if [officers] reasonably, but mistakenly, believe
that a third party consenting to the search has the authority to do so." State v.
Sawyer, 784 A.2d 1208, 1211 (N.H. 2001) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186). The
Supreme Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment does not require that
officers "always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 185. Indeed, officers often confront "'more or less ambiguous'" circumstances
"'in the course of executing their duties'"; therefore, "'room must be allowed for
some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men,
acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.'" Id. (quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949)).
8

As with all law enforcement conduct implicating the Fourth Amendment,
"[t]he standard for assessing apparent authority to consent is an objective one: to
determine whether a police officer's belief was objectively reasonable, a court must
examine whether 'the facts available to the officer at tjie moment . . . [would]
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief thatthe consenting party had
authority over the premises/" Sawyer, 784 A.2d at 1211 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 188 (quotations omitted)); accord State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, f 14,131 P.3d
246. "If the surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonable person to doubt
whether the third party had the requisite authority, then the officer must make
further inquiry to ensure that the person giving consent has authority to do so."
Sawyer, 784 A.2d at 1211. But again, "a reasonable mistake in determining a third
party's authority to consent does not give rise to an unreasonable search." 4 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.3(g) (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Rodriguez,
Schneckloth, Brinegar, and Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)).
Here, it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe that the driver had
authority to consent to the search of the bags in the SUV If or several reasons. First,
the bags were located in the storage area behind the back seat, an area, not unlike a
trunk, which is typically controlled by the owner/driver; second, there was nothing
about the bags (like a label or identification tag) that suggested they did not, in fact,
9

belong to the driver; and finally, neither the driver nor the passengers stated that the
bags belonged to anyone other than the driver. See Harding, 2010 UT App 8, ^[18.
This is not a case where the bags "clearly d[id] not belong to a consenting driver";
accordingly, there was no necessity for further inquiry. Id. (emphasis added).
Indeed, given the generic nature of the bags, this case is distinguishable from
cases involving an "an item with a label or tag indicating ownership, or a purse,
when there is a male driver and female passenger." Id. (citing United States v. Welch,
4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D.
1991) (officer could not reasonably rely on driver/husband's consent to search
defendant/wife's purse), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Akuba, 686 N.W.2d 406
(S.D. 2004); People v. James, 645 N.E.2d 195,203-04 (111. 1994) (where car occupied by
three women, officer should have ascertained which woman left purse on passenger
seat before searching it pursuant to driver's consent). It is also distinguishable from
cases where a passenger claims the bag prior to its being searched, State v. Soma, 627
A.2d 1074, 1077 (N.J. 1993), or where the consenting driver volunteers that the
suitcases in the trunk belong to the passenger, see United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383,
386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, this is not a case where there was
evidence that the bags belonged to someone other than the consenting driver.
Indeed, there was nothing about the bags themselves that reasonably suggested
10

Officer Westerman could not rely on the driver's consent to search. Cf. Elder, 815
P.2d at 1344-45 (holding officer could not reasonably Relieve Elder's sister had
authority to consent to search where sister's husband had to kick in locked door of
crawl space).
Rather, where, as here, "the vehicle's contents are more anonymous," Officer
Westerman reasonably believed "that the consenting driver/owner exercised
control over the vehicle and the items contained therein." Harding, 2010 UT App 8,
Tf 18. As recognized by the majority, it is not at all unusual to expect that a driver
controls both the car and its contents, even when there are passengers present,
absent some contrary indication. See Harding, 2010 UTApp 8, f 19 (recognizing on
these facts, "[a]ny belief that the bags belonged to one of the passengers would
necessarily be based on speculation"). Thus, other courts have held that officers
reasonably, if mistakenly, believed that a third-party driver had authority to consent
where "there was nothing [like an identification tag] to alert [officers] that both,
none, or only one of the bags . . . belonged to [the driver]," State v. Maristany, 627
A.2d 1066,1070 (N.J. 1993), or where the bag "was not of the type that, on its face,
could not reasonably have been believed to belong to [the driver]," Sawyer, 784:
A.2d at 1212-13; cf. United States v. Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025,1028, (8th Cir. 1998)
(officer reasonably believed garment bag in trunk belonged to driver/defendant's
11

passenger/wife, who consented to the vehicle search, where officer did not see
identification tag on bag).
Another circumstance or "factor upon which courts have relied to find an
officer's belief reasonable is a passenger's failure to object to the search." Sawyer,
784 A.2d at 1211. Defendant did not at any time object to the search here. The State
recognizes that this factor may carry less weight on this record, because it is unclear
how much of the driver's conversation with Officer Westerman, if any, the
passengers overheard, or how much of the search they observed. See Sawyer, 784
A.2d at 1213 (recognizing passenger's failure to object lacked probative value where
record unclear "as to whether [passenger] heard the request to search and [the
driver's response] or whether he observed the search"). However, the most recent
third-party consent case from the United States Supreme Court supports that a
passenger's failure to object is relevant, "[s]o long as there is no evidence that
[officers] have removed the potentially objecting" passenger from the vicinity "for
the sake of avoiding a possible objection." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.
In Randolph, the United States Supreme Court held that officers unreasonably
relied on a co-tenant's consent to search where the other co-tenant was present and
objected. Id. at 122-23. However, the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that
the Fourth Amendment did not require officers "to take affirmative steps to find a
12

potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already
received." 547 U.S. at 122. Rather, "the potential objector nearby, but not invited to
take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out." Id. at 121.
To hold otherwise, the Supreme Court stressed, would undercut Matlock
(common authority) and Rodriguez (apparent authority). Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122.
Neither Matlock nor Rodriguez was present to object t<t> the third-party consent
searches upheld in those cases, but neither were they "far away": Matlock was in a
squad car nearby, and Rodriquez "was actually asleep in the apartment, and
[officers] might have roused him with a knock on the door before they entered with
only the consent of an apparent co-tenant." Id. Randolph thus supports that the fact
Defendant was nearby and did not object to the instant search is relevant, whether
or not she was aware the driver had given consent to search the SUV.
In any event, the reasonableness of Officer Westerman's search here is not
dependant on Defendant's failure to object to it. The circumstances still "were not
so ambiguous as to require [Officer Westerman] to make [further] inquiry." Sawyer,
784 A.2d at 1213. As shown, there was nothing about the bags' location in the rear
cargo area of the SUV or their appearance that reasonably suggested they did not, in
fact, belong to the driver. See id. (upholding search wlhere on record Sawyer's
failure to object "had little or no probative value," because bag searched was not of a
13

type that on its face, could not reasonably have been believed to belong to the
consenting driver). Where there was nothing about the bags themselves that
suggested they did not belong to the driver, the majority correctly recognized that
the mere presence of passengers was insufficient to require Officer Westerman to
make further inquiry. See Harding, 2010 UT App 8, f t 12-14.
It may well be "better law-enforcement practice . . . for police officers
specifically to inquire and attempt to ascertain ownership of luggage in a vehicle
with several occupants, rather than rely on the driver's consent to search," but the
Fourth Amendment does not require it. Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070; cf. Randolph,
547 U.S. at 122 (officers not "required" "to take affirmative steps to find potentially
objecting co-tenant before acting on the persmission they had already received").
Rather, "the validity of the search .. . depend[s not] on whether the [officer] used
the best procedure, but rather on whether the officer's conduct was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances." Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070. As shown,
where the bags were stowed in an area typically controlled by the owner/driver,
and there was no indication that they did not, in fact, belong to the driver, the
circumstances here did not compel Officer Westerman to make further inquiry
before reasonably relying on the driver's consent to search. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 186. While the officer was ultimately mistaken as to the driver's authority to
14

consent, it was the mistake "of [a] reasonable m[a]n, acting on facts leading sensibly
to [his] conclusionf ] of probability/' Id. (case citation and quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, Defendant asserts that the circumstances here are similar to
those in State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998), and Duran, 2005 UT App 409,
where the court of appeals faulted officers for failing to further investigate before
searching. See Pet. Br. at 12-13. But both cases are readily distinguishable. In Davis,
a probation-search case, officers searched, among other things, a Ford Escort parked
on property probationer Davis shared with his non-probationer girlfriend and
codefendant.

965 P.2d at 527, 529. The court of appeals held that officers

unreasonably believed Davis had common authority over the Escort where (1) they
had never seen Davis drive it—he had only been seen driving a van also parked on
the property, and (2) the only indication Davis may haye had any access to the
Escort were allegedly male footprints in the snow leading up to it, which could have
also been made by the many officers on the scene. Id. at 533-535.
In Duran, a common-authority case, officers searched a trailer based on the
landlord's consent. 2005 UT App 409, I f 13-16. But a landlord may not generally
grant consent to search leased premises. See Duran, 2001} UT App 409, f 15 (citing
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)); see also
4L Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.5(a) (4th ed. 2004) (collecting cases).
15

Knowing they had only the landlord's consent, however, officers in Duran acted on
that consent to search without any "reasonable inquiry into the [landlord's] mutual
use of the trailer." Duran, 2005 UT App 409,116.
In sum, the circumstances in both Davis and Duran indicated that a third party
controlled the premises to be searched. In contrast, other than the passengers' mere
presence in the SUV, nothing in this case indicated that the bags in the storage area
belonged to anyone other than the driver.

Davis and Duran, therefore, are

inapposite.5
Defendant argues that any ambiguity triggers an officer's obligation to make
further inquiry. See Pet. Br. at 9, 17, 21. But in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
expressly recognized that some ambiguity is to be expected in third-party consent
cases. 497 U.S. at 186 (recognizing officers often confront "more or less ambiguous"
circumstances and "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part" (case
citation and quotation marks omitted)). And in Randolph, the Court emphasized
5

Defendant asserts that the driver's consent in this case is weaker than the
landlord's consent in Duran because officers in Duran also had probable cause to
believe a crime was being committed, whereas Officer Westerman lacked even
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity here. See Pet. Br. at 17-18. Contrary to
Defendant's assertion, neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion is a
prerequisite to a valid consent; they are, in fact, irrelevant. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at
106; Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-52; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171;
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
16

that the ambiguity inherent in third-party consent cases does not mean officers must
always "take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting [third party] before
acting on the persmission they had already received/' 547 U.S. at 122. Rather, as
shown, even where passengers are present, it is only when there is evidence
suggesting an item in fact belongs to someone other than the consenting driver that
the Fourth Amendment requires additional inquiry. See, e.g., Jams, 86 F.3d at 386,
389-90; Welch, 4 F.3d at 764; see also James, 645 N.E2d at 203-04; Sawyer, 784 A.2d at
1212-13; Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070; Souza, 627 A.2d at 1077; Zachodni, 466 N. W.2d
at 628. Accordingly, because the consenting driver here clearly controlled the SUV,
and there was no evidence that control did not extend to the bags in the cargo area,
the majority correctly concluded that Officer Westerman reasonably relied on the
driver's consent to search the bags.
Finally, Defendant also relies on State v. Frank, 630 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002), but that case misconstrues Fourth Amendment law. See Pet. Br. at 16,
18-20. In Frank, as here, an officer obtained consent to search from the driver, and
upon opening the trunk found two suitcases inside, which he searched without first
ascertaining whether they belonged to the driver or to Fr^nk. 650 N.W.2d at 215. In
holding the search was unreasonable, the Minnesota court created an essentially per
se rule that "when a vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer has an
17

obligation to ascertain the ownership of items not owned by or within the control of
the consenter when the circumstances do not clearly indicate that the consenter is
the owner or controls the items to be searched/' Id. at 219. The Harding majority
correctly recognized that "Frank's requirement is too sweeping." Harding, 2010 UT
App 8,117. Where, as here, the driver has consented to a search and the contents of
the vehicle are "more anonymous," id. at f 18, the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment does not compel officers to "take affirmative steps to find a
potentially objecting [passenger] before acting on the permission they had already
received" from the driver. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
185 (Fourth Amendment does not require that officers "always be correct, but that
they always be reasonable").
In sum, the majority correctly held that Officer Westerman reasonably
believed that the driver's consent to search the SUV included the bags stowed
therein, because there was no evidence the bags belonged to anyone other than the
driver. The bags were stowed in an area typically controlled by the owner/driver,
there was nothing about the bags7 appearance that suggested they did not belong to
the driver, and neither the driver nor any passenger volunteered that the bags
belonged to Defendant rather than the driver.

Given the totality of these

circumstances, the majority correctly held that Officer Westerman reasonably, if
18

mistakenly, relied on the driver's consent to search the SUV, including the bags.
Absent any evidence suggesting the bags did not in fact belong to the driver, the
Fourth Amendment did not compel Officer Westerman to ascertain whether the
bags, in fact, belonged to the driver before he could reasonably rely on the driver's
consent to search them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the majority opinion.
Respectfully submitted 10 January 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff
fcase No. 081400645
vs.
J^idge Claudia Laycock
TINA MARIE HARDING,
June 12,2008
Defendant.

This matter came before the court for oral arguments on the defendant's Motion to
Suppress on June 4, 2008. The plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, Craig R.
Johnson. The defendant appeared in custody of the Utah County Sheriff and was roprosontod by
Barbara A. Gonzales. Having reviewed the file, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the
memoranda presented by both parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties, the court issues
the following:
I. PROCEDUAL HISTORY
1. On March 19, 2008, during the preliminary hearing, the couift bound over the defendant
for trial on 1) illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, 2) possession or use of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 3) false informatipn to a police officer, and 4)
use or possession of drug paraphernalia.
2. The defendant filed her Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of her Motion to
Suppress on April 25, 2008.
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3. On May 2, 2008, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.
4. On May 28, 2008, the court requested additional pleadings addressing State v. Hansen, 63
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
5. The defense filed her additional memorandum on June 2, 2008 and the State filed its
additional memorandum on June 3, 2008.
6. The court heard oral arguments on June 4, 2008 and took the matter under advisement.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for
an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m.
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman discovered that the
driver's license had been denied.
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could drive the vehicle from
the scene, Officer Westerman requested the names and dates of birth for each of the
passengers and discovered that none of the passengers had a valid license.
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a citation for an
inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license.
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the vehicle and told the
driver that she was free to leave.
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6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. At that point Officer
Westerman requested permission to look in the vehicle and fhe driver gave consent.
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman asked the driver to
search the vehicle, but was not involved in the search.
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the defendant's bags. They
were located in a storage area directly behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a
passenger in the vehicle.
9. Before searching the bags, neither Ms. Harding nor any of thp other passengers indicated
to whom the bags belonged.
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying Ms. Harding as the owner
of the bags were found in the bags during the search.
11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested Ms. Harding and
during the search incident to arrest, Officer Westerman found a blade knife on Ms.
Harding's person.
II. PARTIES' STIPULATIONS
12. The initial traffic stop was legal.
13. The defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties have stipulated to two important issues that the dourt would normally have to
determine in a case such as this. First, the defense acknowledged and the court finds that the traffic
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stop conducted by Officer Westerman was justified at its inception. Second, the State has
acknowledged and the court finds that Ms. Harding has standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the vehicle search because she had a reasonable expectation to privacy in her bags and she never
abandoned them. In State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178 (Utah App. 2003), the trial court denied the
motion to suppress because it determined that the defendant lacked standing. The Bissegger court
overturned that ruling, concluding that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her
belongings and that she never abandoned them. Unlike Bissegger, in the case before the Court
here, standing and abandonment are not disputed.
But similar to Bissegger, the Court must now determine whether the search of the vehicle
conducted by Officer Westerman was lawful. To determine this, the Court must ask three
questions. First, was Officer Westerman's action in stopping the vehicle justified at its inception?
Second, did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the detention? And third, were Ms.
Harding's bags within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle? As noted above, both parties
agree that the answer to the first question is yes: the initial stop was lawful. Thus, the court is left to
determine whether the search exceeded the scope of the detention and whether Ms. Harding's bags
were within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle.

A.

DID THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE
DETENTION?
In general an officer must have a warrant to search a vehicle, but one of the exceptions to

the warrant requirement is voluntary consent of the vehicle owner. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1217-18 (Utah 1993). Here, it is undisputed that Officer Westerman obtained the consent of
the driver before searching the vehicle. However, as seen in both Bissegger and State v. Hansen,
4

63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), a search may be illegal even with consent if the search exceeds the scope
of the detention. In both of those cases, the consent obtained was not valid because the traffic stop
had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter. Similarly, Officer Westerman's search of the
vehicle would be legal only if he had obtained consent after the encpunter had de-escalated to a
consensual encounter.
Hansen sets out an excellent roadmap of analysis to determine whether an encounter has
de-escalated or not. The general rule is that "a traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter
when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she
is free to.. .depart." Id at 661. As a threshold matter "a stop may not be consensual unless the
driver's documents have been returned to him." Id. But, when the facts of a case pass this threshold
matter (as it did in Hansen and as it does in the case before the court), the court must look to other
factors to determine whether a traffic stop has de-escalated. As set out in Hansen, "informing a
person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to answer additional questions" weighs in favor
of de-escalation. Id. But a "coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one
officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone
of voice" weighs against de-escalation. Id at 662. The Hansen court explained that, under the facts
of that case, a reasonable person would not think the encounter at ispue in the case had
de-escalated; in fact, a reasonable person could believe that the encounter had escalated. Id First,
the factual differences between the initial stop and the additional questioning were minimal in that
the show offeree by the questioning officer had not materially changed. Id. Second, at the time of
the additional questioning, a second patrol car with its lights on arrived on the scene, which could
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have made a reasonable person believe the encounter was escalating, not de-escalating. Finally,
the officer never told the driver he was free to leave and began the additional questioning before
issuing a citation or addressing the alleged violation. Id.
Unlike Hansen, the traffic stop in this matter had de-escalated to a consensual encounter
before Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Before Asking for consent,
Officer Westerman had returned all the driver's documents and had given her a citation for the
traffic violations, indicating she was free to leave. A reasonable person would have known she was
free to leave. The second officer was already present before the driver was asked for her consent to
search the vehicle, so a reasonable person would not have thought the encounter had escalated, as
was the case in Hansen. Finally, the driver voluntarily came back to the officer with an additional
comment or question—initiating further conversation herself. It was during this conversation, not
before, that Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Unlike Hansen, a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances in this case. The court
concludes that the stop had de-escalated before consent was given and, therefore, the search of the
vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention.
The defense argues that, while the driver may have felt free to leave before consenting to
search the vehicle, Ms. Harding, as a passenger inside the vehicle during the conversations
between Officer Westerman and the driver, did not feel free to leave. The court, however, sees no
need to rule as to whether or not Ms. Harding felt free to leave because the question is irrelevant
under these circumstances. As explained in Biggegger, "a car passenger does not normally have
standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory interest in the car." 76
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P.3d at 181. Nowhere in record is there any indication that Ms. Harding had either a possessory or
ownership interest in the vehicle—she was just a passenger. It is true that she has standing to
challenge the search because she owned the bags that Officer Westetman ultimately searched, but
since Officer Westerman lawfully received consent from the only person in the vehicle who had a
possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle, the search of the vehicle was lawful. To rule
otherwise would require an officer to gain consent from every passenger before searching a
vehicle (because each passenger may have personal belongings in the vehicle) and to individually
tell each passenger that he or she was free to leave. The case law dods not support that conclusion.
Thus, regardless of whether Ms. Harding reasonably felt free to leav$ or not, Officer Westerman's
search was proper because the traffic stop had already de-escalated, Officer Westerman received
consent from the driver, and, therefore, the search did not exceed the scope of the detention.
B.

WERE MS. HARDING'S BAGS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT TO
SEARCH THE VEHICLE?
It is undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags

because she never abandoned them. However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate
expectation of privacy becomes irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal.
The court directs the parties' attention to Florida v Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). In Jimeno, an
officer gained consent to search a vehicle in which the driver and hi$ wife were occupants. Id at
249-50. After the passenger stepped out of the vehicle, the officer found a brown paper bag on the
passenger floorboard with cocaine inside. Id at 250. The United States Supreme Court overturned
the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that a general consent to search a vehicle did not extent to a
closed bag on the floorboard. Id. The Supreme Court explained, "[IJijfthe driver's] consent would
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reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no
grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization." Id at 252. It further explained, "We think that
it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search
respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs." Id
at 251. Clearly, then, the standard for determining whether Officer Westerman's search of the bags
was within the scope of the consent is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to
conclude that the bags were part of the consent given. The court concludes that it was.
There is no indication in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or
attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given those circumstances,
Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the
contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme Court explained in Jimeno, it is objectionably reasonable
for an officer to search a container "which might bear drugs." Id. Bags in a vehicle could certainly
contain drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively reasonable.
Thus, Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent given to search the vehicle.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, Officer Westerman's action was justified in its inception, the search
did not exceed the scope of the detention, and Ms. Harding's bags were within the scope of the
consent given to search the vehicle. Therefore, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress.
The State shall prepare the appropriate findings, conclusions, and order and submit them for the
court's signature.
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DATED this (2JUday of June, 2008.

Fourth District .Court Judge
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Tina HARDING. Defendant and Appellant
No. 20080772-CA.
Jan 22,2010.
Rehearing Denied Feb 8, 2010.
Background: Defendant was convicted pursuant to
conditional guilty pleas in the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Claudia Laycock, J., of illegal
possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J.,
held that:
(1) encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer
de-escalated from investigatory detention to consensual encounter, and
(2) search of defendant's bags was based on a reasonable belief that they belonged to dnver of vehicle
and that driver had authority to consent to their
search.
Affirmed.
Thome, J., dissented and filed opinion.
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Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and GREENWOOD.™1
FN1. Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela
T. Greenwood heard and voted on this case
as regular members of the Utah Court of
Appeals. They both retired from the court
on January 1, 2010, before this decision issued. Hence, they are designated herein as
Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-103(2) (2008); Sup.Ct. R. of Profl
Practice 11-201(6).

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
T[ 1 Defendant Tina Harding appeals her convictions
for illegal possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person. These charges stem from the
search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Specifically, she appeals the trial court's
denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained
during the search, arguing that the search of her
bags, which were inside the rear storage compartment of the vehicle, was *1150 a violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
T( 2 Defendant was a passenger in her friend's
vehicle when Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a
traffic stop for an equipment violation because the
vehicle's plate lamp was inoperable. Officer Westerman ran a routine check on the driver and learned
that she did not have a valid driver license. He then
requested the names and birth dates of each of the
three passengers and discovered that none of them
had a valid driver license.™2 Officer Westerman
asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and driving
without a license. He then told her she was free to
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leave, but advised her to contact someone to come
drive the vehicle because none of the passengers
had a valid driver license. The driver began to walk
toward her vehicle but returned to ask Officer
Westerman a question. At that point, Officer Westerman asked her if he could look in the vehicle and
she consented. Officer Westerman asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and told them they could
wait with the backup officer "if they wanted." This
second officer arrived before Officer Wresterman
completed his investigation and prior to the driver
consenting to a search. The emergency lights on
both of the officers' vehicles were off before the
driver exited her vehicle.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] H 5 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress evidence because
the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure. We afford little discretion to the
district court's determination in cases involving the
legality of a search and seizure "because there must
be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement
and prosecutorial officials." State v. Hansen, 2002
UT 125, «([ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

ANALYSIS
FN2. Defendant initially gave a false name
to Officer WTesterman.
^| 3 During Officer Westerman's search of the
vehicle he found a brown bag and a blue bag FN3
in the cargo space behind the back seat of the
vehicle. Before searching the bags, Officer Westerman did not ask to whom they belonged, and none
of the passengers claimed ownership of them. There
were no visible indications on the bags that they belonged to anyone other than the driver. The bags
contained drugs and drug paraphernalia and other
items indicating the bags belonged to Defendant.
Officer Westerman then searched Defendant and
found a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade.
Officer Westerman arrested Defendant and gave her
Miranda warnings.
FN3. Although Defendant describes the
bags as backpacks in her briefs, Officer
Westerman testified that they were bags.
He was the only witness who testified.
U 4 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but
the trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered
conditional guilty pleas, see State v. Scry, 758 P.2d
935, 938-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (discussing and
expressly authorizing guilty pleas conditioned upon
the ability to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence), and now appeals.

I. The Initial Detention De-escalated to a Consensual Encounter
[2][3][4][5][6] H 6 Unreasonable searches are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. IV.
This protection extends to automobile stops, although reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the
"purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
When a traffic stop occurs, "the driver of the car is
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment .... [and] a passenger is seized as well and so
may challenge the constitutionality of the stop."
Brendhn v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127
S.Ct. 2400, 168 t-Ed.2d 132 (2007). That seizure
continues "[fjor the duration of a traffic stop." Arizona v. Johnson, — U.S. — , — , 129 S.Ct. 781,
782, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Generally* 1151
speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic violation observed by an officer is justified. See Hansen, 2002
UT 125, K 30, 63 P.3d*650. Recognizing this principle, the parties in this case stipulated that the initial traffic stop w^s a legally valid investigatory detention.
[7][8][9] U 7 "Onde the purpose of the initial stop is
concluded ... the person must be allowed to depart."
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Id ^ 31 Further, "[a] traffic stop that begins as a
seizuie may de-escalate to a mere consensual encounter" Id ^1 33 Thus, we consider whether the
vehicle occupants' encounter with Officer Westerman had de-escalated from an investigatory detention to a consensual encounter before Officer Westerman asked the driver if he could look m her
vehicle Any investigatory traffic stop may properly
be determined to have "de-escalate[d] to a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart " / J ^ 39
[10][11][12] H 8 In State v Hansen 2002 UT 125,
63 P 3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court addressed deescalations to consensual encounters By definition,
" 'an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not
be deemed consensual unless the dnvei's documents have been returned to [hei] ' " Id \ 40
(quoting United States v Gregon, 79 F 3d 973,
979 (10th Cirl996)) If the driver's documents
have been returned, we consider "factors tending to
show de-escalation," including "informing a person
[s]he is free to leave, or that [s]he does not have to
answer additional questions" Id ^ 41 By contrast,
factors that weigh against de-escalation include
"failure to issue a warning or citation before engaging m additional questioning" and "a coercive
show of authority, such as the presence of more
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical
touchmg by the officer, or [the officer's] use of a
commanding tone of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled" Id (internal quotation
marks omitted)
U 9 In Hansen the supreme court reversed this
court's decision that a traffic stop had de-escalated
to a consensual encounter, determining that there
was no noticeable break between the initial traffic
stop and the further questioning unrelated to the
purpose for the traffic stop See id ^ 6^ In addition, the officer did not address the traffic violations before questioning the defendant about possible contraband and did not tell the defendant he

was free to leave See id ^ 45 Because the supreme
court "questionfed] whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave befoie being issued a warning or citation, or at least being told he or she could
leave," id, it concluded that the "detention had not
de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time
of the additional questioning, and thus, [the defendant] was illegally seized," id ^ 46
[13] *| 10 In this case, howe\er, the driver's documents had been returned to her and she was cited
for the equipment violation and lack of a driver license Further, there was a distinct break in the encounter when Officer Westerman told the driver she
was free to leave At that point, the purpose of the
traffic stop had clearly been concluded However,
the driver then approached Officer Westerman to
ask a question While it is true that there was a
backup officer present, the facts do not suggest coercion For example, the officers' vehicles' emergency lights were off, and there is no indication that
the officers' weapons were displayed, that the officers touched the driver or the passengers, or that
the officer used a commanding tone of voice See
id \ 41 (listing these criteria as examples of behavior that would indicate coercion)
If 11 We conclude that, under these circumstances,
the driver would have reasonably felt free to leave
and, therefore, the encounter had de-escalated to a
consensual encounter See id ffl[ 33-34 Thereafter,
the driver consented to a search of the vehicle Although Defendant lacked standing to object to the
search because she did not own or exercise authority over the vehicle, the State stipulated that she
had standing to challenge the search of her bags because she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the bags and did not abandon them Thus, we turn
to the legality of the search of Defendant's *1152
bags™ ~
FN4 Defendant's primary argument pertaining to the legality of the search is that
there was no de-escalation from the seizure
resulting from the traffic stop We have determined that de-escalation did occur prior
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to the driver consenting to the search and
that Defendant lacks standing to object to
the consent to search the vehicle. However,
Defendant also argued to the trial court,
and briefly on appeal, that the seizure of
the passengers continued during the
vehicle search because the passengers
could not have reasonably believed they
were free to leave. The trial court rejected
this argument as irrelevant because Defendant could not object to the vehicle
search because she did not own the
vehicle. Defendant cites no authority addressing whether, when the traffic stop is
over from the driver's standpoint, it is also
over for any passengers. Furthermore, Defendant does not address how, if at all, deescalation as to the driver from a valid
traffic stop to a consensual encounter affects her status as a passenger. In this respect, Defendant's brief is inadequate. See
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313
(Utah 1998) (noting that generally we will
not address an inadequately briefed argument).
Our analysis assumes that, as is the case
here, nothing happened to raise any suspicions about the vehicle's passengers.
The only facts of record that would indicate a continued detention of the passengers is Officer Westerman's request
that they exit the vehicle and suggestion
that they stand by the second officer
while Officer Westerman conducted the
search. Nothing occurred that would
cause Officer Westerman to suspect Defendant or the other passengers of illegal
activity or to believe that they had a
basis to object to a search of the vehicle
or its contents. Given these circumstances and the lack of adequate briefing
by Defendant, we decline to further address this possible issue. See id.

II. The Search of Defendant's Bags Was Legal
[14] U 12 Our analysis of the legality of the search
of Defendant's bags begins with the question of
whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to
conclude that the driver's consent extended to Defendant's personal belongings. As noted above, the
State concedes that Defendant has standing to challenge whether the officer had a reasonable belief
that the driver's consent to search the vehicle extended to Defendant's bags.
[15] t 13 In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111
S.Ct 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under
the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective* reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801
(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89,
110 S.Ct. 2793, |lll L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). In Jimeno, the car driver consented to a search and the
officer searched a folded, brown paper bag located
on the floor of the car, discovering cocaine in the
bag. See id. The Court examined whether the consent extended to tjhe paper bag and concluded "that
it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search [the] car included consent to search containers within that car
which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may
be expected to kriow that narcotics are generally
carried in some fbrm of a container." Id. Furthermore, if a person consents to a general search of
their property, within which is contained property
owned by another person, the consent is valid so
long as the consenting party has authority over the
area or has a "sufficient relationship to the premises
or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Messer,
2007 UT App 166, % 21, 164 P.3d 421.
U 14 The critical inquiry then is whether the police
officer reasonably believed that the consenting
party has sufficient authority to consent to the
search. In State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, 164
P.3d 421, the police searched a car located on a
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third party's property with the property owner's
consent and discovered contraband in bags in the
car's trunk belonging to the defendant. See id. \ 4.
This court noted that common authority over property was not necessarily dependent on ownership,
but could also be established by possession. See id.
% 22. The search and seizure were upheld
"[bjecause the officers could have, at the very least,
reasonably believed that [the property owner] had
authority to consent to a search of the car trunk and
its contents." Id. ^ 23.
f 15 The State cites cases holding that a driver's
consent to a vehicle search extends to the property
of a third person in the vehicle when the property
does not clearly belong to a person other than the
driver. *1153 See United States v. Hammons, 152
F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir.1998) (noting that the defendant's garment bag was properly searched where
the defendant's wife consented to the vehicle search
and the officers did not see identifying tags on the
bag, reasonably believing that the bag belonged to
the defendant's wife); State v. Sawver, 147 N.H.
191, 784 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (200i) (holding officers reasonably believed driver had authority to
consent to search of bag belonging to defendant);
State v. Maristany, 133 NJ. 299, 627 A.2d 1066,
1070 (1993) (stating officers had reasonable belief
driver had authority to consent to search of luggage
in vehicle trunk where there were no indications
luggage belonged to passengers). The State further
contends that because the ultimate test of a search's
legality is objective reasonableness, police officers
are not required to seek permission to open each
closed container during a consensual vehicle
search, because consent to search a vehicle "is
equivalent to general consent to search the vehicle
and its contents, including containers such as luggage," United States v. Grain, 33 F.3d 480, 484
(5th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Rich, 992
F.2d502, 508 (5th Cir.1993)).
^f 16 Defendant disagrees with the State's application of this case law and argues that the driver's
consent in this case did not extend to Defendant's

bags located in the rear of the car. In support of that
argument Defendant urges us to adopt the rule applied in State v. Frank 650 N.W.2d 213
(Minn.Ct.App.2002). There, a vehicle was stopped
for having only one working headlight. See id. at
215. After citing the driver for the equipment violation, the officer became suspicious of drug activity,
separated the individuals in the car, and asked the
driver for and received permission to search the
vehicle. See id. The officer opened the trunk of the
vehicle and found two suitcases. See id. The officer
did not ask who owned the suitcases and did not
ask permission from the passengers to search the
suitcases. See id. The officer found drugs and later
learned that the suitcase belonged to the defendant,
a passenger in the vehicle. See id. The Minnesota
court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and
"conclude[d] that the cases holding that a driver's
consent to search a motor vehicle does not extend
to property owned by passengers who are present
and available to consent to the search of their property are more consistent with constitutional limits
on warrantless searches than the cases that conclude
otherwise." Id. at 218-219. The Minnesota court
held that, "when a vehicle search is based only on
consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the
ownership of items not owned by or within the control of the consenter when the circumstances do not
clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or
controls the items to be searched." Id. at 219.
T[ 17 Here, Defendant argues that a reasonable person in Officer Westerman's position would reasonably believe that the bags belonged to one of the
three passengers rather than to the driver. The presence of the three passengers and the location of the
bags in the small storage space behind the rear passenger seat would lead to that reasonable belief.
Under these circumstances, Defendant asserts, Officer Westerman should have inquired about the
bags' ownership and sought consent to search from
anyone who asserted ownership. Defendant contends that without having done so, Officer Westerman's search of the bags was illegal. We do not
agree, and we believe that Frank's requirement is
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too sweeping.
K 18 As acknowledged in Frank, in determining
what justifies a legal search, "[e]ach case depends
on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the
officer to hold in a particular situation." Id. at 217
(citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111
S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)). If items in a
vehicle clearly do not belong to a consenting driver
and there are passengers who may likely own the
items, the driver's consent to search would not reasonably extend to those items. Examples might include an item with a label or tag indicating ownership, or a purse, when there is a male driver and a
female passenger. See United States v. Welch, 4
F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that under the
circumstances it was not reasonable for officers to
believe male driver had authority to consent to
search of his passenger/girlfriend's purse). Other
situations where the vehicle's contents are more
*1154 anonymous would likely lead to an objectively reasonable belief that the consenting driver
owned and/or exercised control over the vehicle
and items contained therein.
^[ 19 The particulars of the situation in this case
lead us to conclude that the search of Defendant's
bags was based on a reasonable belief that they belonged to the driver and that the driver had authority to consent to their search. These particulars include the following, taken from the brief testimony
of Officer Westerman, the only witness called to
testify: (1) there was a small storage area in the rear
of the car behind the backseat; (2) items in this
storage area included a brown bag and a dark blue
bag, and various loose items; (3) there was nothing
on or about the bags to indicate they belonged to
anyone other than the driver; (4) the vehicle's occupants consisted of the driver and three passengers;
(5) neither the driver nor any of the passengers informed Officer Westerman about where they had
been or where they were going; (6) none of the
vehicle's occupants stated that the bags belonged to
anyone other than the driver; and (7) no one objected to the search. Under these circumstances it was

objectively reasonable for Officer Westerman to
believe the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief
that the bags belonged to one of the passengers
would necessarily be based on speculation. On the
other hand, it is patently reasonable to believe that
a car owner would toss or place bags or other items
in a small storage area of a car, located behind the
passenger seat. We therefore conclude that under
these circumstances, search of Defendant's bags
was lawful.
H 20 Affirmed.
U 21 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Senior
Judge.
THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
U 22 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, as I cannot agree with its conclusion that the
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's
consent was permissible. Here, the trial court expressly found that, under the circumstances, Officer
Westerman "had no way of knowing whose bags
they were." Accordingly, I disagree that Officer
WTesterman can be said to have had a reasonable b e lief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, and I
would hold that the State failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent
authority to consent to the search of Defendant's
bags.
U 23 Both the trial court and, to a lesser extent, the
majority opinion treat this as a case about the scope
of the driver's consent. It is not. There is no dispute
that, had the bags belonged to the driver, permission to search the bags would have been included
within the scope of her consent to search the car.
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct.
1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ("We think that it
was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs."). Rather, the
question presented in this case involves the driver's
authority to consent to the search of the bags.
\ 24 " Tf a third party rather than the defendant
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consents to a search, the third party must be one
who possesses "common authority" over the area or
has some other "sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected" ' "
State v Messer, 2007 UT App 166, ^ 21, 164 P 3d
421 (quoting State v Brown, 853 P 2d 851, 855
(Utah 1992)) "Moreover, a search is valid even in
instances where the third party does not possess
common authority, as long as the police
'reasonably beheve[ ]' " that the third party possesses such authority Id (alteration m original)
(quoting Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 U S 177, 189,
110 SCt 2^93, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990)) However,
the State bears the burden of establishing that one
who consents to a search has the authority to do so
See Bioxxn 853 P 2d at 855 ("The State bears the
burden of proving common authority, and it must
do so by a preponderance of the evidence "), see
aho State x Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 23, 164 P 3d
397 ("When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden
of proving the reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative detention ")
% 25 It is undisputed in this case that the driver did
not have actual authority to consent*1155 to the
search of Defendant's bagsFN^ Thus, m order for
the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate
that the facts known to Officer Westerman would
nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable
caution to conclude that the driver had such authority Cf State v Dm an 2005 UT App 409, \ 14, 131
P 3d 246 ("If the facts known to the officers would
not cause a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the consenting party had authority over
the premises, 'then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually
exists' " (quoting Rodriguez 497 U S at 188-89,
110 S Ct 2793)) It appears that the only indicia of
ownership or control of the bags was their mere
presence m the driver's vehicle, along with multiple
passengers and m an area accessible to those passengers As the trial court aptly found, this information alone gave Officer Westerman 'no way of
knowing whose bags they were "

FN5 The trial court found that Defendant
had not abandoned her bags and retained a
legitimate expectation of privacy in them.
Further, this is not a case where Defendant
left her bags m the care of a third person
and thereby took the risk that the third person might not respect her privacy See,
eg, State ^ Messer, 2007 UT \pp 166, ]\
22, 164 P 3d 421 ("[I]n leaving the bags in
Hasch's
car
on
Hasch's
property,
[defendant took the risk that Hasch might
not maintain [defendant's privacy interest
m the bags"), see also United States \
Austin, 66 F3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cn 1995)
("By leaving his bag m the possession and
control of [a third party], defendant assumed the risk that [the third party] would
allow the authorities access to the bag ").
K 26 At best, Officer WTesterman was presented
with a situation where ownership and control of the
bags was ambiguous Utah law requires further inquiry before a consent search can be deemed valid
in such ambiguous situations See id ^ 17 ("The officers were faced with an ambiguous situation concerning the trailer Although it was owned by
Mother, it was rented to Horvath Despite that ambiguity, the officers made no further inquiry and
proceeded with the warrantless [consent] search
The search was not lawful
" (footnote omitted)),
State v Dans, 965 P 2d 525, 533 (Utah
Ct App P98) (stating that the State's burden to
prove common authority cannot be met " 'if agents,
faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless
proceed without making further inquiry' " (quoting
Lmted States I Whitfield, 939 F 2d 1071, 1075
(DCCirl991)))
^[ 27 Had Officer Westerman made further inquiry,
he could likely have easily ascertained that the bags
belonged to Defendant and sought her consent to
search them If further inquiry had resulted m the
passengers, including Defendant, denying ownership of the bags, then Officer Westerman would
have had some reason to believe that the bags be-
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longed to the driver Or, had everyone denied ownership of the bags, then perhaps an abandonment
analysis would have been appropriate See generally State \ Rxnhart 2005 UT 84, H 21. 125 P 3d
938 (discussing abandonment), see also United
States v Veatuh, 674 F 2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th
O r 1981) (finding abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet found on the
seat of a vehicle) Here, however, Officer Westerman made no inquiry whatsoever and, thus, his
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's
consent cannot be deemed objectively reasonable
under Utah case law governing consent searches

App 8
END OF DOCUMENT

U 28 Because I would suppress the results of the
search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah case
law, I see no need to rely on Defendant's primary
source of authority, State -\ Frank 650 N W 2d 213
(Minn Ct App 2002) Howe\ er, I agree with the logic and analysis of Frank and note that its commonsense holding is itself merely another way of stating
Utah's law that a consent search based on apparent
authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of
ownership or control See id at 219 ("[W]hen a
vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer
has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of
items not owned by or within the control of the
consenter when the circumstances do not clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or controls
the item to be searched ")
% 29 When Officer Westerman searched Defendant's bags pursuant to the dmers consent, he had
"no way of knowing whose bags they were " Faced
with this ambiguity as to whose bags they weie, Officer WestermanV1156 search, without further inquiry, is objectively unreasonable and, therefore,
unlawful See Dwan 2005 UT App 409, «[ 17. 131
P 3d 246, Davis 965 P 2d at 533 For these reasons, I would suppiess the results of the search and
reverse Defendant's resulting comictions, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion
Utah App 2010
State v Harding
223 P3d 1148, 648 Utah Adv Rep 4, 2010 UT
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Addendum C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FILED

..j^mf^^rAPPEUATE COURTS
JUL 2 7 2010

JUL 2 7 2010

State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Respondent TAPPEALT
Case No. 20100291-SC

v,

Tina Harding,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on April 9, 2010.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue.
Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals
erred in its analysis and/or application of the Fourth Amendment
standards governing the apparent authority of a person to consent
to a search of another person's property.
A briefing schedule will be established ,hereafter.

For The Court:

Dated

I'U-d

Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice
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